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“The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier”  
(Otto von Bismarck) 
 
Following the Lehman bankruptcy, which marked the end of the „evolutive‟ stage of the 
global economic crisis and escalated it to what can be described, without exaggeration, as a 
full-blown emergency, Hungary was among the first compelled to seek assistance (in the 
form of a loan, not aid) from the international financial organisations and the European 
Union. More than two years have passed since the signing of the agreement. This paper 
focuses on Hungary, which has been hard-hit by the current global economic recession, and 
foreign analysts were afraid that Hungary could become the scene of a major financing 
drama. In this country there were prior mistakes in economic policy that increased its 
vulnerability to external shocks. Hungary has turned to the IMF for financial assistance and 
carried out a complex, multi-approach program from 2008. The government‟s responses to 
the downturn, along with IMF conditions for assistance, are also seen to have caused harm 
with pro-cyclical policies. This paper describes the Hungarian crisis management alongside 
the Standby arrangement‟s guideline to the Hungarian budget restriction steps. The official 
response to the crisis seems to have made matters worse. European countries chose fiscal 
assessments which contain the reduction of the debt and budgetary expenses, and decided on 
reform programs in order to change the state budget structures since May 2010. The fiscal 
policies of member states of the European Union (Germany and France) – in light of the 
Greek public debt crisis – were directed to restrictions rather than easing moves. EU 
institutions were committed to implement sanctions, including the transformation of the rules 
concerning liquidation of the European Union. 
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1. Introduction  
The International Monetary Fund1 in the Letter of Intent and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding2 concluded: “Hungary has emerged from a severe 
                                                   
1 In my study I use as primer source articles and studies from IMF‟s and European Commission‟s 
archives (www.imf.org; www.ec.europa.eu).  
2 (IMF 2010) http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2010/102510.htm 
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crisis, but the recovery is fragile. The combination of improved policies and 
significant adjustment in the context of the IMF/EU-supported program, the 
availability of large and upfront official financing, and an easing of global financial 
conditions brought a faster-than-expected stabilization.” During the international 
financial crisis, the first IMF-supported program among the new EU member states 
started with Hungary in late 2008. It was clear that the sustainability of this program 
depended heavily on the chances to ensure that Western European banks remained 
engaged in their host country, in Hungary. 
Hungary was in a fragile economic condition when the financial crisis broke 
out. In November 2008, acknowledging the government‟s commitment to maintain 
the fiscal consolidation process and to prevent a more severe financial market crash, 
a joint financial assistance of up to 20 billion euros was provided to Hungary, bound 
to policy conditions. In order to counteract the decreasing revenues caused by 
declining output, the government also implemented a mix of structural and 
temporary expenditure saving measures. An important goal was to ensure that these 
programs would not be perceived as a private sector bailout. Hungary is an open, 
export-driven economy. As a consequence, the global slowdown and faltering 
demand in its main export markets has had a negative impact on economic growth, 
especially in the export-orientated automotive and consumer electronics sectors. In 
2009, the Hungarian economy shrank by 6.3%. This was attributable to three 
factors: the slump in agricultural output following the sector‟s outstanding growth in 
2008; the increasingly rapid decline in other sectors that began as early as 2008; and, 
finally, the continuing downturn in the construction sector that began two years ago 
(although at that stage, it was limited to only 5%). While the rest of the world has 
loosened fiscal policy, Hungary‟s cyclically adjusted primary budget balance has 
improved to 4.5% of GDP in the past two years. As a result, Hungary is in the 
unique position of not being required to tighten fiscal policy as growth recovers, 
suggesting that medium-term growth prospects are particularly favourable. 
2. Background 
2.1. The economic environment in Hungary before the crisis 
Let‟s begin the story in the summer of 2006 from when the international financial 
markets and the business community had lost their trust so the Hungarian economy 
had been brought to the edge of the abyss by years of highly irresponsible and 
inconsistent economic policy – and not so much by the oft-cited lack of structural 
reforms, although this was of course also a factor. As the consequence of long years 
of lax budgetary and incomes policies, and the ostensibly strict monetary policy 
intended to counterbalance this, the dangerous deterioration in the external and 
internal financial equilibrium was increasingly plain to see (Surányi 2010, p. 21.). 
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GDP growth in Hungary was driven by the expansion of exports and 
investments. Between 2001 and 2008, export growth was exceptionally high at 
11.5% per annum, and the structure of exports showed an upward trend. After 1998, 
the share of technology-intensive and high-value-added sectors such as machinery, 
transportation equipment and ICT products grew significantly3. In the summer of 
2006, despite the (overly) benign global money and capital-market environment, the 
prospect of a fatal deterioration in the external and internal balance made an 
economic correction inevitable. The program drawn up and launched after the 
elections was extremely painful, and not only in terms of the specific measures that 
it entailed. The acceptance of this program, and adapting to it, was even more 
difficult for everybody than is customary at such times. In the light of the previous 
years‟ highly effective propaganda, the deliberate misleading of public opinion, the 
serial self-deception, and finally the unrealistic election promises made by virtually 
every side, the correction and austerity measures were, without a doubt, a source of 
great disillusionment. 
The convergence program was implemented in the face of strong opposition4, 
against the backdrop of a deep crisis of confidence, in a highly debatable structure, 
and without the requisite professional groundwork. However, the program intended 
to achieve a massive fiscal correction after a lengthy period of procrastination, and 
for this reason it was quite justified. In the space of two and a half years, the budget 
deficit was forced down from over 11% to 3–4% of GDP. Although the structure of 
the corrective measures is highly controversial, another important and favourable 
aspect of the program – besides the quantitative correction achieved – nevertheless 
deserves highlighting. After many years, the budget deficit not only came into line 
with the program that had been approved by Parliament, but in every year was 
visibly lower than this. In other words, the unpredictability of fiscal policy, which 
had previously made it impossible to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy, was 
finally eliminated. In the light of the antecedents, this was perhaps the most 
important change to the substance of government policy. Besides the quantitative 
fiscal correction, therefore, another commendable change was the strengthening of 
fiscal discipline, which led to greater predictability and less uncertainty. 
Despite exceeding the targets for improving the fiscal balance, the perception 
of the Hungarian economy did not improve, or least not by any significant degree. 
Besides the loss of political and personal credibility, a key factor in this was 
probably the considerable slowing in growth that was a short-term side-effect of the 
correction. In the light of neighbouring countries‟ burgeoning economic growth – 
which, incidentally, was often unsustainable there, too – the annual 1–2% rate of 
expansion in the Hungarian economy was judged to be conspicuously weak. In 
addition, due to the unfavourable structure of the correction, even this virtually non-
existent growth was accompanied by an unsustainable external financing 
                                                   
3 ITD Hungary archives http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=Itdh_Economy 
4 Prime Minister‟s archives www.miniszterelnok.hu  
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requirement of 8–9% of GDP, and a rise in the foreign debt that appeared 
unstoppable as a result. 
From 2006, Hungary‟s economic development had slowed and GDP growth 
remained below 4% as fiscal consolidation became the focus of economic policy. 
The government‟s austerity programme reduced Hungary‟s large budget deficit, but 
reforms dampened domestic consumption, slowing GDP growth to less than 2% in 
2007 and 0.6% in 2008. 
Each country in Europe and elsewhere was hit by two forms of the crisis, one 
was the financial crisis and the other was a real economic crisis. This latter was 
partly the result of the financial crisis. In October-November 2008 Hungary was 
projected worldwide in the press as the next Iceland, speeding towards collapse. But 
Hungary had another severe problem besides the double crisis: the crisis of 
indecision, missing the opportunity to carry out relevant structural reforms for the 
past 10 years. All the analyses started by saying Hungary is severely indebted – but 
according to professor Surányi5 this statement6 simply isn‟t true. The analysts 
assumed that foreign debt amounted to approximately 100 percent of GDP, 
however, 40–42 percent of this consisted of foreign direct investments made by the 
likes of General Electric, General Motors, Audi, Intesa Sanpaolo, Raiffeisen, KBC, 
IBM, and Fiat in Hungary for business purposes. There was absolutely nothing 
negative about that – in fact, it casted the country in a rather positive light. Before 
the crisis, Hungary was already heavily indebted close to 70% of the GDP and its 
growth potential had shrunk towards the end of the 1990‟s to roughly 2%. 
According to professor Surányi: “the gross debt of Hungary denominated in foreign 
currency does not exceed 50 percent of its GDP. In no way can this be regarded as 
particularly high. The Hungarian authorities are not able to communicate these 
facts through international forums in a convincing way to analysts, researchers, 
investments banks and market players.” Despite the fiscal stimulus that raised the 
general government deficit to 9.3% of the GDP in 2006, GDP grew by only 4% in 
that year. That was coupled with a huge budget deficit in 2006 which almost reached 
10% of GDP, an obviously unsustainable level. The growing deficit prompted the 
second Gyurcsány government under pressure of the EU to decrease the budget 
deficit. Consequently, the budget deficit declined from close to 10% in 2006 to 3.8% 
by the end of 2008. But parallel to that there had been a huge sacrifice in GDP 
growth. The previous years‟ huge deficit and low growth, the huge differential in 
domestic and international currency interest rates, and the high level of indebtedness 
of the population in foreign currency which made the country largely exposed to 
foreign exchange moves preserved the country‟s bad international evaluation. Thus, 
all of this made Hungary very vulnerable at the beginning of the financial crisis. In 
                                                   
5 Former Governor of the National Bank of Hungary 
6 How big is Hungary‟s problem? – Interview with György Surányi www.portfolio.hu November 14, 
2008 
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early October 2008, Hungary was quite severely hit by sudden panic in financial 
markets and a credit crunch. They had a certain routine for how to deal with such 
situations. Thus, Hungary was very quick in October 2008 to turn to the IMF for a 
stand-by loan facility. This was an unusual step by a country who was a member of 
the European Union. But the government was determined to do that in order to have 
a big enough buffer to prevent the collapse of the national currency. 
In the autumn of 2008, in a context of reduced risk appetite linked to the 
global financial crisis, financial market conditions in Hungary rapidly deteriorated to 
the extent that the external financing needs of the government could no longer be 
met through market channels. In November 2008, acknowledging the government‟s 
commitment to maintain the fiscal consolidation process and to prevent a more 
severe financial market crash, a joint financial assistance (a combination of the IMF 
and the European Commission and the World Bank) up to 20 billion euros was 
provided to Hungary, linked to severe policy conditions (fiscal adjustments). The 
conditions were the following:  
- keeping nominal wages in the public sector constant throughout 2009 
- eliminating the13th monthly salary in the public sector 
- capping the 13th monthly pension payment for pensioners and eliminating the 
13th monthly pension payment for all early retirees 
- postponing the indexation of selected social benefits7  
In order to counteract the decreasing revenues caused by declining output, the 
government also implemented a mix of structural and temporary expenditure saving 
measures8. The loan and accompanying measures have helped to consolidate the 
situation, but at a very weak level. This hurt 1.7 million families in Hungary out of 
the 4 million families who had foreign currency debt. The country was in a very 
shaky position throughout the winter. The Hungarian people endured huge austerity 
adjustment measures that really cut standards of living without mass grievances. 
The Hungarian macroeconomic data can be found in the Table 1. 
                                                   
7 www.miniszterelnok.hu 
8 European Commission archives 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2010_spring/hu_en.pdf 
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Table 1. Hungary: Main Economic Indicators 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real economy (change in percent)      
Real GDP 4.2 4.8 4.1 3.9 1.3 
Private consumption 7.8 2.8 3.6 1.9 –1.9 
Gross fixed investment  2.2 7.6 5.3 –2.5 0.1 
Exports 6.2 15.6 11.5 19 14.2 
Imports  9.3 13.4 6.8 14.7 12 
CPI (end year)  5.7 5.5 3.3 6.5 7.4 
CPI (average) 4.6 6.8 3.6 3.9 7.9 
Unemployment rate (average, in percent)  5.9 6.1 7.2 7.5 7.4 
Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP) 1/ 25.2 25.9 23.6 23.1 23 
Gross national saving (percent of GDP, from BOP)  17.3 17.5 16.8 17 18 
General government (percent of GDP), ESA–95 basis 2/      
Overall balance  –7.2 –6.4 –7.8 –9.2 –5.5 
Primary balance  –3.4 –23 –3.9 –5.5 –1.7 
Debt 58 59.4 61.7 65.6 66 
Money and credit (end-of-period, percent change)      
M3  12 11.6 14.6 13.7 11.1 
Credit to nongovernment  34.4 19.2 18.9 17.1 17.3 
Interest rates (percent)      
T-bill (90-day, average)  8.2 11.1 6.8 7 7.6 
Government bond yield (5-year, average)  6.4 9.7 8 6.9 7 
Balance of payments      
Goods and services trade balance (percent of GDP)  –3.8 –2.7 –0.5 0.4 2.5 
Current account (percent of GDP)  –7.9 –8.4 –6.8 –6.1 –5 
Reserves (in billions of US dollars)  12.8 16 18.6 21.6 24 
Gross external debt (percent of GDP) 3/  61.6 67 75 90.5 96.4 
Net international investment position (in percent of GDP)  77.2 83.5 92.4 100.9 100.5 
Source: www.imf.org 
2.2. The budget deficit and the financial crisis 
The deep global recession has focused attention on the need for counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy. The fiscal stimulus requires a careful evaluation of fiscal space and 
available financing (Kandil–Hanan 2010, p. 3.). The half of the large increase in 
budget deficits in major economies around the world is due to collapsing tax 
revenues and to low (often negative) growth. Less than ten percent is due to 
increased discretionary public expenditure, as in stimulus packages (Galbraith 2010, 
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p. 2.). Can governments afford the cost of the fiscal stimulus, hoping for higher 
revenues once recovery is at full speed to service the new debt and ensure 
sustainability? While fiscal expansion may be necessary to stimulate economic 
activity, not every country has the resources to finance fiscal stimulus.  
Some countries, like Hungary, do not have enough fiscal space to run 
countercyclical policy during a recession with limited access to financing from 
international capital markets, and high concerns about policy credibility and debt 
sustainability9. 
It is important to realize that, while the direct costs of the financial crisis on 
governments may appear large, they are in fact relatively small compared to indirect 
costs arising from losses of tax revenues and increased expenditure to provide 
demand stimulus. Financial rescue programmes, including capital injection, treasury 
purchase of assets and lending as well as upfront government financing are 
amounting and a significant part of this is likely to be recovered (Cecchetti et al 
2010, p. 2.). 
By contrast, overall fiscal balances have been deteriorating sharply – by 20–
30 percentage points of GDP in just three years in the world. And, unless action is 
taken almost immediately, there is little hope that these deficits will decline 
significantly by 2011. So, in the absence of immediate corrective action, these 
deficits will persist even during the cyclical recovery (Cecchetti et al 2010, p. 3.). 
2.3. The EU Commission delivers a comprehensive package of legislative measures 
Fiscal assessments have to be considered against the background of the sharp 
economic and financial crisis which has had a major impact on public finances. 
Reflecting the working of automatic stabilizers and discretionary stimulus measures 
implemented in line with the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) to cope 
with the exceptional economic circumstances, a large majority of Member States is 
currently subject to the excessive deficit procedure following corresponding Council 
decisions in 2009. This implies that the medium-term budgetary strategies of these 
countries have to be assessed against the background of the recommendations to 
correct their excessive deficits by the deadlines set by the Council.  For most 
countries this year will mark a fiscal consolidation process consistent with the 
recommendation set out in the Excessive deficit procedures (EDPs). According to 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of budgetary surveillance 
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, EU Member States must 
submit updated macroeconomic and budgetary stability programmes. This 
                                                   
9 In Hungary, the Government Debt Management Agency Private Company Limited by Shares 
(Államadósság Kezelő Központ Zrt. – ÁKK) is responsible for debt management. ÁKK is 100% state 
owned and the Minister Responsible for Public Finances being the Minister of National Resources 
exercises the shareholders‟ rights. The Minister Responsible for Public Finances manages public debt 
through ÁKK under the regulations of the Public Finances Act. 
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regulation is also referred to as the 'preventive arm' of the Stability and Growth 
Pact10. 
The European Commission adopted on 27/09/2010 a legislative package 
containing the most comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the 
EU and the euro area since the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Broader and enhanced surveillance of fiscal policies, but also macroeconomic 
policies and structural reforms are sought. The recently agreed "European semester" 
will integrate all revised and new surveillance processes into a comprehensive and 
effective economic policy framework. The proposals are the concrete translation of 
the recent Commission communications on economic governance dated 12 May and 
30 into legislative proposals. All these reforms are compatible with the existing 
Treaty of Lisbon and should ensure that the EU and the euro area benefit from more 
effective economic policy coordination. That should give the EU and the euro area 
the necessary capacity and strength to conduct sound economic policies, thereby 
contributing to more sustainable growth and jobs, in line with the Europe 2020 
strategy. The legislative package is made up of six pieces of legislation: four 
proposals deal with fiscal issues, including a wide-ranging reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), while two new regulations aim at detecting and addressing 
effectively emerging macroeconomic imbalances within the EU and the euro area. 
For Member States of the euro area, changes will give teeth to enforcement 
mechanism and limit discretion in the application of sanctions. In other words, the 
SGP will become more "rules based" and sanctions will be the normal consequence 
to expect for countries in breach of their commitments. 
1. A Regulation amending the legislative underpinning of the preventive part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation 1466/97): 
The preventive part of the SGP is meant to ensure that EU Member States follow 
prudent fiscal policies in good times to build up the necessary buffer for bad times. 
To break off with past complacency in good economic times, the monitoring of 
public finances will be based on the new concept of prudent fiscal policy making 
that should ensure convergence towards the Medium-Term Objective. The 
Commission may issue a warning in case of significant deviation from prudent fiscal 
policy for the euro area Member States. 
2. A Regulation amending the legislative underpinning of the corrective part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation 1467/97):  
The corrective part of the SGP, is meant to avoid gross errors in budgetary policies. 
The regulation is amended so that debt developments are followed more closely and 
put on an equal footing with deficit developments as regards decisions linked to the 
excessive deficit procedure. Member States whose debt exceed 60% of GDP should 
                                                   
10 European Commission (2008b) 
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take steps to reduce it at a satisfactory pace, defined as a reduction of 1/20th of the 
difference with the 60% threshold over the last three years11. 
3. A Regulation on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the 
euro area: 
Changes in both the preventive and corrective part of the SGP are backed up by a 
new set of gradual financial sanctions for euro-area Member States. As to the 
preventive part, an interest-bearing deposit should be the consequence of significant 
deviations from prudent fiscal policy making. In the corrective part, a non-interest 
bearing deposit amounting to 0.2% of GDP would apply upon a decision to place a 
country in excessive deficit. This would be converted into a fine in the event of non-
compliance with the recommendation to correct the excessive deficit. To ensure 
enforcement, a "reverse voting mechanism" is envisaged when imposing these 
sanctions: this means that the Commission's proposal for a sanction will be 
considered adopted unless the Council turns it down by qualified majority. Interests 
earned on deposits and fines will be distributed among euro-area Member States 
neither in excessive deficit nor in excessive imbalance. The changes are devised so 
that they should facilitate the eventual move to a system of enforcement linked to 
the EU budget as foreseen in the Commission communication of 30 June12. 
4. A New Directive on requirements for the budgetary framework of the 
Member States: 
Since fiscal policy-making is decentralized, it is essential that the objectives of the 
SGP are reflected in the national budgetary frameworks, i.e. the set of elements that 
form the basis of national fiscal governance (accounting systems, statistics, 
forecasting practices, fiscal rules, budgetary procedures and fiscal relations with 
other entities such as local or regional authorities). The directive sets out minimum 
requirements to be followed by Member States. 
5. A New Regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances: 
The Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) is a new element of the EU's economic 
surveillance framework. It comprises a regular assessment of the risks of imbalances 
based on a scoreboard composed of economic indicators. On this basis, the 
Commission may launch in-depth reviews for Member States at risk that will 
identify the underlying problems. For Member States with severe imbalances or 
imbalances that put at risk the functioning of EMU, the Council may adopt 
recommendations and open an "excessive imbalance procedure (EIP)". A Member 
State under EIP would have to present a corrective action plan that will be vetted by 
the Council, which will set deadline for corrective action. Repeated failure to take 
                                                   
11 European Commission archives http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/eu-
economic-governance-legislative-measures_en.htm 
12 European Commission archives http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/eu-
economic-governance-legislative-measures_en.htm 
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corrective action will expose the euro area Member State concerned to sanctions 
(see the following point). 
6. A Regulation on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area: 
Like in the fiscal field, if a euro-area Member State repeatedly fails to act on 
Council EIP recommendations to address excessive imbalances, it will have to pay a 
yearly fine equal to 0.1% of its GDP. The fine can only be stopped by a qualified 
majority vote ("reverse voting", see above), with only euro-area Member States 
voting. These proposals will be examined by the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee. The Commission calls all parties to work 
towards a speedy adoption of these proposals (European Commission 2010)13. 
The Council of the European Union decided to establish a European stabilisation 
mechanism. The mechanism is based on Art. 122.2 of the Treaty and an 
intergovernmental agreement of euro area Member States. Its activation is subject to 
strong conditionality, in the context of joint EU/IMF support, and will be on terms 
and conditions similar to the IMF14. 
3. The medium-term financial assistance from the EU and the Stand-by 
Arrangement with the IMF 
The loan raised from the international institutions – to put it in somewhat simplistic 
terms – was used to top up the currency reserves (in other words, from the 
perspective of the real economy it hardly represented any real direct easing of the 
situation). It was the failure to top up reserves for many years during the preceding 
period of unprecedented market liquidity that fundamentally limited the range of 
available monetary-policy responses to the crisis. To put it another way, one could 
confidently state that all the weaknesses of the Hungarian economy – such as the 
relatively high level of external indebtedness, the high public debt, the overly 
extensive and badly-structured fiscal redistribution of funds, the extremely rapid and 
unfavourably-structured growth in forint and foreign-currency lending (and not so 
much its actual stock and currency structure), the significantly overvalued forint, the 
high positive real interest rates and, last but not least, the severe drop in the 
economy‟s potential growth rate, which is partly attributable to a combination of all 
the above factors combined – still don‟t go the full way to explaining the panic of 
autumn 2008. The urgent call for outside assistance by the government and the 
central bank, in contrast to the other countries in the region, was chiefly precipitated 
by the critically low level of foreign exchange reserves. 
Only from this starting point is it possible to understand the responses of 
Hungary‟s economic policy to the crisis, even if one can‟t agree with them. 
                                                   
13 European Commission (2010a) 
14 Council of the European Union presse release 9596/10 
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Unusually, it is worth starting the analysis from the monetary-policy side. After the 
Lehman bankruptcy, the markets – far more than the aforementioned analysts – were 
aware of the Hungarian economy‟s vulnerability (to external factors). In the absence 
of abundant currency reserves, the Hungarian money and capital market, and thus 
the forint, became a soft target for market speculation. Unarmed in the absence of 
sufficient international reserves, at the mercy of the markets and incapable of 
intervening effectively in the market using its own resources, the MNB watched 
from the sidelines as events unfolded: the dangerous weakening of the forint 
exchange rate, the jump in market interest rates and risk premiums, the second 
drying-up of the government securities market in the space of a year (March and 
September-October 2008), and the increasingly oppressive shortage of both forint 
and foreign-currency liquidity in the banking system.  
For a few drama-filled days in autumn 2008, the central bank, which until 
then had argued in favour of a strong forint for the weak economy (and which 
believes that the exchange rate has no impact on exports – sic!) watched in paralysis 
as the forint began to spiral  downward. Then, and this time with good reason, it 
raised the reference rate by 300 basis points, the only central bank in the region to 
do so. But the question needs to be asked again: why didn‟t it also intervene in the 
currency market, why didn‟t it extend generous liquidity support, either in forint or 
foreign currency, to the banking sector, and why didn‟t it step in and create liquidity 
(through open-market transactions) in the secondary government securities market? 
There are probably two reasons for this. One is the aforementioned technical factor, 
the lack of sufficient foreign exchange reserves. The other is a broader matter of 
principle, which may also have contributed to the shortage of reserves in the first 
place.  
Even in August-September 2008, out of principle, the MNB refused to 
entertain even the suggestion of any currency market intervention. Naturally, 
nobody seriously believes that it is possible, through intervention, to permanently 
reverse the basic processes that are determined by fundamentals. Nevertheless, the 
purchase and sale of currency in the market is one of the available monetary-policy 
means of influencing market liquidity. It is certainly no coincidence that it features 
in the monetary-policy arsenal of all serious central banks (with the exception of the 
MNB prior to January 2009). If the central bank has sufficient reserves, and these 
can be easily mobilised, then it has the means of limiting and discouraging market 
speculation to a certain degree. In the years prior to September 2008, the central 
bank, in a stable environment – while avoiding any unrealistic strengthening of the 
forint – could have topped up the currency reserves to the necessary level (if it 
hadn‟t been focusing one-dimensionally on suppressing inflation at any cost). This 
would naturally have cost money, a lot of money in fact (indeed, it would have 
resulted in a slightly higher, but sustainable and therefore credible, rate of 
disinflation), but it would still have been less costly than the damage caused by a 
monetary policy that was paralyzed by the lack of reserves.  
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The worst aspect of the lack of reserves was not simply the shame arising 
from the fact that – tarring ourselves with the same brush as the „undesirables‟ – we 
immediately had to turn to the IMF in October 2008 for credit with which to top up 
the reserves. This in itself would perhaps have been bearable. The low international 
reserves, however, prevented the central bank from performing one of its basic 
functions. Even over a short, 3–6-month horizon, the central bank was incapable of 
guaranteeing the liquidity of the Hungarian financial system without any major 
hitches; in other words it was only partially able to fulfil its role as the „lender of last 
resort‟ (Surányi 2010, p. 22.). 
The fiscal and monetary policy-leaders, the Minister of Finance of Hungary 
and the President of the Hungarian Central Bank requested that the International 
Monetary Fund support their program through a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for a 
period of 17 months in the amount of SDR10.5 billion (€12.5 billion). The 
Managing Director of the IMF, issued the following statement on the 13th October 
2008 on Hungary: 
“Against the background of global financial turbulence, Hungary's 
government securities market and some other key markets have experienced stress 
over recent days. These pressures emerged despite the country‟s improved 
macroeconomic and financial policies of the past years, which include a 
strengthening of its fiscal position, a narrowing of the current account deficit, and a 
cautious implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies. ” (…) 
“The authorities have responded to the recent turmoil in global markets 
through a continuation of their macroeconomic convergence program, coupled with 
enhanced monitoring of financial sector developments and increased deposit 
guarantees, which were augmented in line with an EU-wide move.” (…) 
“To complement these efforts, we are in close dialogue with the Hungarian 
authorities and the EU to discuss further responses to the current challenges, 
including possible technical and financial support by the IMF. I have informed the 
authorities that the IMF stands ready to assist their efforts. We will provide 
technical assistance as needed and, in the context of a supportive policy setting, are 
ready to undertake discussions on possible financial assistance, responding 
rapidly.”15 
For a period of 17 months from November 6, 2008, Hungary had the right to 
make purchases from the Fund in an amount equivalent to SDR 10,537.5 million. 
Hungary‟s right to engage in the transactions covered by this Arrangement can be 
suspended only with respect to requests received by the Fund after (a) a formal 
ineligibility, or (b) a decision of the Executive Board to suspend transactions. The 
formal purpose is to suppress or to limit the eligibility of Hungary. 
                                                   
15 IMF (2008a) 
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Their main objectives were:  
1. to reduce the government‟s financing needs and improve long-term fiscal 
sustainability, 
2. to maintain adequate capitalization of the domestic banks and liquidity in 
domestic financial markets,  
3. to underpin confidence and secure adequate external financing.  
Fiscal consolidation in 2006–2008 was the cornerstone of the government‟s 
efforts to reduce macroeconomic vulnerabilities. As a share of GDP, primary 
government expenditures in 2008 were reduced to below the level envisaged in the 
budget. 
The revised budget envisaged a general government deficit of 2.5 % of GDP, 
which implied a structural fiscal adjustment of about 2.5 % of GDP. Revenues, 
which were difficult to project precisely in the critical environment, were expected 
to decline somewhat as a percentage of GDP, reflecting the slower growth of the tax 
base and the effect of the spending measures outlined below. The tax cuts were 
envisaged for 200916. 
The necessary adjustment focused on the expenditure side, which seems 
consistent with the need to reduce Hungary‟s comparatively large public sector as a 
share of GDP. Specifically, primary government expenditure (which excludes 
interest payments) was reduced by 2 percentage points of GDP compared to 2008. 
This was achieved by 1) keeping nominal wages in the public sector constant 
throughout 2009; 2) eliminating the13th-month-salary for public servants; 3) 
capping the 13th-month pensions and eliminating the 13th-month pensions for early 
retirees; 4) postponing the indexation of selected social benefits; and 5) trimming 
operating expenditure allocations to all ministries across the board.  
Within the government‟s expenditure envelope, the government gave priority 
to investment projects co-financed by EU funds and programs designed to support 
small and medium-sized enterprises. The program was primarily monitored through 
the primary cash balance of the central government including social security and 
other extra-budgetary funds (a quarterly performance criterion)17. 
The EU medium-term financial assistance to Hungary was also decided on in 
November 2008. Hungary received three instalments of the EU €6.5 billion balance 
of payments loan: two instalments of €2 billion each on 9 December 2008 and 26 
March 2009 and a further €1.5 billion on 6 July 2009. In view of the improved 
access to market financing, Hungary did not (draw) call for on EU and IMF 
assistance upon the completion of the reviews in November 2009 and February 
                                                   
16 www.imf.org 
17 IMF (2008b) 
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2010. The EU assistance was granted for a period of two years until 3 November 
201018. 
The mission welcomed the government's commitment to the 2010 deficit 
target of 3.8 % of GDP and recognized that following the budgetary slippage in the 
first half of 2010, a number of steps will be taken to correct the situation, including 
sizeable revenue-enhancing and expenditure-saving measures. The corrective 
measures considered so far still fall short of the required adjustment and are largely 
of a temporary nature. 
However, the government was not in a position to respond to a number of 
open questions at the time of the mission. The government also has to make 
increased efforts to bring the deficit under 3 % of GDP in 2011 on a sustainable 
basis. This was required under the European Council‟s excessive deficit procedure 
recommendation. In the area of structural reforms, some measures were 
implemented by both the outgoing and the incoming governments. Nevertheless, 
rather than realizing durable savings in the area of long-distance public transport in 
accordance with the balance of payments assistance conditions, budget transfers to 
this sector are expected to increase compared to 2009.  
The Commission services also voiced concerns that the 0.7 % of GDP pre-tax 
financial sector levy which has since been enacted as a temporary source of revenue 
could, in its current form, have a significantly negative impact on the country‟s 
investment climate and economic growth. The mission urged the authorities to 
review some features of the levy in this regard. In addition, it was considered that 
several items in the same complex bill, as it remained before the Parliament through 
the duration of the mission, may potentially not be in compliance with EC law. The 
mission further recalled the government's obligation to respect the full independence 
of the central bank, including its operations. The Commission services, together with 
the International IMF, are ready to resume the talks whenever the authorities 
consider that this would be productive. As with the balance of payments assistance 
that was extended to Hungary in 2008, a possible successor program would have to 
be anchored in credible commitments to sound fiscal policy. This is a necessary 
condition for ensuring sustainable growth and for reducing the vulnerabilities that 
stem from Hungary's high public debt to GDP ratio. It is also indispensable for 
allowing the government to meet its obligations under the excessive deficit 
procedure. 
During 2008, the international financial crisis severely reduced Hungarian 
access to foreign capital. This has lead to difficulties in the banking system 
(including foreign banks operating within the country as well as local banks). The 
results in the financial account of the balance of payments – a deficit of 5.9 billion 
euros in 2009 (6.6% of GDP), as compared to a surplus of 10.6 billion euros in 2008 
                                                   
18 European Commission archives 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/2010–08–05-hungary-review-
postponed_en.htm  
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(10.1% of GDP) – show how drastically conditions tightened in the international 
financial environment. Finally, Hungary requested IMF support to help face the 
crisis in the financial and foreign exchange markets. The stand-by arrangement 
signed with the Fund included measures to bring the government deficit, as a 
percentage of GDP, down to 3.4 in 2008, and to 2.5 in 2009  Hungary‟s projected 
GDP growth rate fell to only 1.8 percent in 2008, and to –1.0 percent in 2009.  
As time went by and the crises (both international and domestic) worsened, 
the estimates were revised. The government deficit would now reach 3.9% of GDP 
(up from the previously estimated 2.5%); GDP growth in 2008 would hit about half 
of one percent in 2008, and –6.7% in 2009. In Hungary, tolerance for public deficits 
was limited and the government continued to pursue fiscal restraint. Even though the 
IMF accepted upward revisions of the fiscal deficit target, the prevailing goal 
continued to be one of containing spending. This trend has continued in spite of the 
obvious consequences that the international situation is having on the domestic 
economy.  
At the end of 2008, a drastic fiscal responsibility law was approved by the 
Hungarian parliament, and the legislation included strict guidelines on spending. 
Among those guidelines are that the budget must define a primary balance target 
two years in advance, and the target cannot be a deficit. Second, the law sets strong 
guidelines for the evolution of public debt. Finally, every year, the budget must 
define the extent to which primary expenditures of the central government may 
change in real value in the following year. Of course Hungary‟s political instability 
has not improved business or investor confidence. At the end of March, Standard 
and Poor‟s lowered credit ratings of Hungary to “BBB minus” from “BBB”. The 
ratings agency expected GDP to contract by 6% in 2009, and by 1% in 2010 
(Cordero 2009, p. 13.). 
4. The Hungarian government and the IMF relation in 2008–2010  
4.1. From fiscal consolidation to fiscal responsibility – government‟s policies to 
alleviate the impact of the crisis on the labour market 
The Hungarian measures include guarantees, recapitalisation measures and loans 
and are aimed at strengthening confidence in the markets and, above all, financing 
the real economy in a period of crisis. Guarantees are based on Law CIV of 2008 on 
the strengthening of the financial intermediary system, which came into effect on 23 
December 2008, and Government Decree 89/2009 (IV.14.) on procedural 
regulations for the provision of State guarantees in the interests of financial system 
stability, which entered into force on 15 April 2009. The maximum total amount 
committed to State guarantees is HUF 1 500 billion (approximately EUR 5.3 billion. 
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Guarantees may be sought by sound credit institutions (any banks and 
specialised credit institutions specified under the Law on credit institutions) with a 
registered office in Hungary. 
Eligible under this scheme are the debts of a credit institution vis-à-vis its 
creditors denominated in EUR, CHF or HUF and payable in the same denomination 
that arose between 23 December 2008 and 31 December 2009 and that are based on 
a loan agreement or debt security. The scheme was available until 31 December 
2009; it covers debt instruments at a maturity between three months and five years. 
The conditions include rules on the remuneration and duration of the measure, the 
nominal and issuance value of the shares, controlling rights of the State and 
restricting management remuneration. Other conditions vary and are specified in the 
individual guarantee agreements. Under the scheme, the Government either has the 
right to subscribe capital in the credit institution concerned or the credit institution 
must issue shares carrying specific veto rights. 
Recapitalisation is based on Law CIV of 2008 on the strengthening of the 
financial intermediary system, which came into effect on 23 December 2008. The 
maximum amount committed to the scheme until 31 December 2009 is HUF 300 
billion (approximately EUR 1 billion) in accordance with Law XVII of 2009. 
The same institutions that are eligible under the guarantee scheme are eligible 
under the recapitalisation scheme. Recapitalisation may be granted by convertible 
dividend preference shares and preference shares carrying specific veto rights. 
State loans based on Law XXXVIII of 1992 on general government financing 
are introduced by Law IV of 2009 on the State warranty concerning mortgages. 
These regulations came into effect on 11 March 2009, under which the State may 
provide eligible institutions (see the definition set out above in the section on 
guarantees) with loans. The conditions vary and are detailed in each loan agreement. 
According to a loan agreement between the State and FHB of 25 March 2009, 
the bank was granted a total amount of EUR 400 million in two tranches (1 April 
2009 and 30 April 2009) until 11 November 2012, with a market interest rate. 
According to a loan agreement between the State and Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zrt. 
of 14 April 2009, the bank was granted an amount of approximately HUF 170 
billion (approximately EUR 600 million), with a market-based interest rate 
(Petrovic–Tutsch 2009, pp. 45–46.). 
Fiscal consolidation in 2006–2008 was the cornerstone of the Gyurcsány 
government‟s efforts to reduce macroeconomic vulnerabilities. The necessary 
adjustment was focused on the expenditure side, which seems consistent with the 
need to reduce Hungary‟s comparatively large public sector as a share of GDP. 
Specifically, primary government expenditure (which excludes interest payments) 
was reduced by 2 percentage points of GDP compared to 2008. 
The Gyurcsány government in 2006 became committed to maintaining fiscal 
discipline in the long-term, recognizing that this is a key element in retaining 
investor‟s confidence. It therefore intended to continue budget consolidation in the 
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2010 budget and beyond; new medium-term fiscal targets were included in the 
convergence program and in their medium-term fiscal framework. To put fiscal 
sustainability on a permanent footing, the government submitted a draft on fiscal 
responsibility law to the parliament, which established fiscal rules on public debt 
and primary deficit, strengthened the medium-term expenditure framework (rolling 
three-year expenditure ceilings) and created a fiscal council to provide independent 
and expert scrutiny. See Table 2. 
Table 2. The Structure of the EU-IMF loan package billion EUR 
20.0 TOTAL EU-IMF CREDIT FRAME  
» 5.8 Has not been drown   
» 14.2 Drawdowns   
  » 1.4 Total drawdowns by the Central Bank 
  » 12.8 Total drawdowns by the Government 
   » 4.9 IMF/stabilising the banking system 
   » 2.4 IMF/financing the maturing debt 
    » 5.5 EC/financing the maturing debt 
Source: Government Debt Management Agency Private Company Limited by Shares (ÁKK 
Zrt.) 
 
To put fiscal sustainability on a permanent footing, the government submitted 
a draft on fiscal responsibility law to the parliament, which established fiscal rules 
on public debt and primary deficit, strengthened the medium-term expenditure 
framework (rolling three-year expenditure ceilings) and created a fiscal council to 
provide independent and expert scrutiny. 
Table 3. Disbursements from the International Loan Package in 2008 and 2009 EUR 
billion 
  Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 2010 Total 
IMF/ stabilising the banking 
system 
4.9      4.9 
IMF/financing the maturing debt  2.3  0.1   2.4 
EC/financing the maturing debt 2.0 2.0  1.5   5.5 
Total drawdowns by the 
Government 
6.9 4.3 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 12.8 
Source: Government Debt Management Agency Private Company Limited by Shares (ÁKK 
Zrt.) 
 
After escaping the danger of a financial meltdown in October 2008, the 
Hungarian Government concentrated on creating a balance between two challenging 
tasks. 
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First, in order to restore the financial credibility of the country it had to carry 
on with the implementation of austerity measures prescribed by the IMF agreement. 
Second, it had to fix upon policies which would prevent bankruptcies on a large 
scale, high unemployment and social unrest resulting from both the effects of the 
crisis and fiscal tightening. In late October 2008 the Prime Minister convened a 
National Summit of the leaders of political parties, social partners and 
representatives of the academic community to agree upon an adequate crisis 
management strategy. Following this, the cabinet‟s crisis management package was 
in place within a few weeks.  Efforts to preserve workplaces and to slow down the 
loss of jobs in hard hit regions were high on the list of the programme. It was put 
forward that in cases when layoffs could not have been prevented, it was the duty of 
local and central labour offices together with local governments to assist the re-
employment of redundant workers. 
In November a special task-force called the “Governmental Centre for Crisis 
Prevention and Management (GCCM)” was set up, headed by the Prime Minister 
with the participation of selected ministers and with an agenda of having meetings 
every second week. The task of this body was to elaborate the details of the crisis 
management package, to coordinate and supervise implementation and to report to 
Parliament and social partners on the outcomes of actions. The government assured 
transparency by establishing a homepage to provide online information on all the 
major steps of crisis management19. 
In April 2009 the prime minister resigned and a new, so-called crisis-
management cabinet was formed the head of which became the former Minister of 
Economy and Regional Development. A new programme for the short-term crisis 
management of the national economy was introduced20. Chapters related to 
employment and regional issues remained by and large the same as were envisaged 
in the programme of the previous government. The main related points were as 
follows: 
Job preservation programs aim at avoiding the escalation of mass layoffs and 
offer firms five forms of assistance:  
– scope for the partial reduction of wage costs and social contribution tax;  
– support for introducing part-time work and abridged working time;  
– a subsidy for training and retraining costs;  
– the provision of labour market services in the event of job losses;  
– a subsidy for the commuting and residential costs for job seekers.  
                                                   
19 Speaker of the Hungarian Government‟s archives http://www.kormanyszovivo.hu 
20 The Government‟s Crisis Management Program and a list of the completed actions can be 
downloaded from: http://www.kormanyszovivo.hu/news/show/news_1734?lang=hu 
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Firms which apply for participation in this programme are obliged to maintain 
employment of their redundant workers for at least two years and also to keep their 
other employees. Only those firms are qualified which show evidence of their longer 
term viability and can prove that their recently occurred redundancies are the direct 
consequence of the economic crisis. 
Job creation programs implemented to prevent further deterioration of 
employment and increase participation rates in backward regions. On the eve of the 
outbreak of the crisis, the Government elaborated a proposal for Parliament to 
change the eligibility criteria for regular social allowances in the framework of the 
so-called “Pathways to Work” plan. The initiative aimed at motivating inactive and 
long-term unemployed people living on social assistance to improve their 
employability and return to work. The idea was that those non-employed who 
receive social benefits and are able to work should get involved in public work 
schemes or should be assisted by training or labour market services. The proposed 
programme coupled social benefit incentives and active labour market measures 
with stricter control on the availability for public work of the affected persons.  
More funds to finance active labour policies in hard hit regions. An additional 
resource of HUF 20 billion was earmarked for regional labour centres to assist the 
re-employment of those who lost their jobs due to the economic crisis. 
More funds for job creation programs, especially SMEs working in backward 
regions. The eligibility criterion for participating in this scheme was a commitment 
to create at least two new workplaces. Non-repayable financial support could be 
claimed for buying new machines, equipment or know-how.  
Local employment development programs in disadvantageous regions. HUF 
97 billion was allocated for local employment development programs in the 33 least 
developed regions. Another HUF 30 billion was provided for the management of 
local employment crises in micro regions. 
4.2. Fiscal policy and structural fiscal reforms 
A core objective of the program was to buttress Hungary‟s commitment to 
sustainable public finances by containing the government‟s short-term financing 
need and credibly reducing it over the medium term. To this end, in June 2009 the 
Bajnai government adopted and continued to implement a comprehensive package 
of entitlement, public service, and tax reforms, aimed at permanently reducing 
public expenditures and stimulating potential growth. By better anchoring market 
expectations and creating room for a cautious reduction in policy interest rates, these 
measures allowed Hungary to take full advantage of the ongoing stabilization of 
global financial conditions. Over the medium term, the combination of fiscal 
discipline, higher growth, and lower interest rates were expected to put the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio firmly on a declining path.  
The Bajnai government remained fully committed to its general government 
deficit target (Maastricht definition) of 3.9% of GDP in 2009. It expected higher 
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spending by line ministries and on health care and unemployment benefits, as well 
as lower corporate tax revenue, to be offset by lower interest expenditures and a 
reduction in identified contingency reserves. 
The budget adopted by parliament on November 30, 2009 was consistent with 
the aim to reduce the general government deficit to 3.8% of GDP in 2010. 
Compared to the draft that was submitted to the parliament, the adopted budget 
allocated part of the specific reserves to higher spending on healthcare, school 
meals, and education (the latter two helped to reduce pressures on local government 
spending) and to a reduction in the VAT on district heating. Consistent with the 
Bajnai government‟s commitment to gradually reduce the public transport system‟s 
need for government support, measures were taken aimed at improving the financial 
situation of the sector. These measures included eliminating the redundancy between 
railway and long-distance bus lines, and implementing efficiency gains (including in 
procurement procedures). 
The budget contained appropriate buffers to mitigate fiscal risks in 2010. The 
government strengthened expenditure control by assigning treasurers to line 
ministries. In addition, the remaining amount of specific reserves was added to the 
stability reserve, bringing overall budgetary reserves to 0.8% of GDP. Any extra 
revenues that could result from a better than projected macroeconomic performance 
were used to boost reserves available to deal with risks and to reduce the adjustment 
in spending that were needed in 2011 to bring the deficit (Maastricht definition) 
below 3% of GDP. 
The Bajnai government intended to review expenditure rationalization aimed 
at improving the efficiency of the delivery of public services, possibly with the 
International Monetary Fund‟s technical assistance. 
4.3. Risks of the budget  
The downside risks to the fiscal target in 2010 (see also table 4.) include the 
uncertainty surrounding tax revenue and interest payments projections, the financial 
performance of MAV (Hungarian State Railways), BKV (Budapest Transport 
Company) and Malev (Hungarian Airlines), and spending by local governments in 
an election year. Furthermore, there was a possibility that Eurostat may decide that 
revenues related to the shift from the second pillar to the first pillar of the pension 
system would count towards the 2009 fiscal balance. To mitigate these risks: 
– treasurers assigned to line ministries should reduce overspending risks by 
keeping spending in line with budgetary commitments (in contrast to 2009 
when the treasurers were assigned towards the end of the year). 
– the government discussed the MAV business plan that was prepared in 
December 2009 in collaboration with the company. While progress has been 
slow, it expected final adoption by the Ministry of Transport on behalf of the 
state by end-March 2010. Should risks materialize nevertheless, the policy 
response would include both the use of budgetary reserves, which amount to 
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about 0.5% of GDP, and the implementation of identified additional spending 
cuts of 0.2% of GDP.  
Any extra revenue that could result from a better-than projected 
macroeconomic performance was supposed to be used to boost reserves, which were 
being kept available to safeguard against risks and to reduce the necessary 
adjustments in spending them in 2011. Also, any additional revenue that could result 
from the sale of emission credits accrued under the Kyoto protocol was planned to 
be either spent on new environmental projects or saved for such projects in later 
years. 
Table 4. Maturity profile of the central government debt 
Instruments Debt stock 
Forint debt 10,677.4 
Publicly issued HUF bonds 7,899.1 
HUF bonds issued by private placement 422.6 
Discount Treasury Bills 1,534.9 
Retail securities 335.6 
HUF loans 485.2 
Foreign exchange debt 9,478.2 
Foreign currency loans raised abroad 4,437.2 
Syndicated and other foreign currency loans 28.7 
Foreign currency loan taken over from NBH in 1997  0.0 
Domestic foreign currency loans 0.0 
Foreign currency bonds 5,012.3 
Kingdom of Hungary 1924 issue 0.0 
Total 20,155.7 
Other debt 314.8 
Total central government debt 20,470.5 
Source: Government Debt Management Agency Private Company Limited 
by Shares (ÁKK Zrt.) 
 
To ensure the consistency of budget procedures with the Act on the legal 
status and financial management of budgetary institutions adopted in December 
2008, the Bajnai government adopted and published in December 2009 a 
government regulation on the implementation of the Act. It adopted a government 
regulation relative to the rules on the advance payment of EU subsidies, aligning 
these rules with best practices. 
 Ádám Kerényi 56 
5. The relationship between the new Hungarian government and the IMF in 
2010 
Since in Hungary the national elections were approaching, the rhetoric connected to 
the IMF and the loan was very aggressive. But the rhetoric does not describe well 
the facts of the inner situation of the country's real domestic conditions, and they do 
not take note of the country's exterior constraints, consisting of rights fixed in 
contracts and obligations. 
For the sake of avoiding a financing crisis, the elected Parliament completed 
partial harm averting. In early July 2010 the Hungarian government decided to levy 
a new tax on banks and other financial companies that would raise some 855 million 
dollars in 2010 and 2011. Foreign banks, who made a fortune during Hungary‟s 
bubbly growth years prior to the crash in 2007, protested and lobbied, but – despite 
having the IMF on their side – they did not succeed. 
On 17 July 2010 the negotiations between the IMF, the Commission and the 
Hungarian Government on extending the standby credit facility previously granted 
to the country to 2011, were suspended. According to reports in the press, the 
government did not present a complete economic schedule for 2011 supported by 
figures, and regarded the requirements imposed under the supervision process as 
serious intervention in the country's economic policy. 
It is well known that, without the loan of EUR 6.5 billion which the EU 
extended in November 2008 with exemplary speed, Hungary's national currency 
would not have survived the speculative attacks which followed the world economic 
crisis21. However, the government refused to give in to IMF demands for further 
budget deficit reduction and negotiations were suspended by the Commission. 
The suspension of the negotiations has sent an inauspicious message to the 
currency markets and government bond markets: following the announcement, the 
exchange rate of the forint began to plunge in relation both to the Swiss franc and to 
the Euro, causing damage valued in billions HUF to a mass of Hungarian citizens, 
who are saddled with a huge outstanding debt. 
We can not know why exactly the Commission delegation left the 
negotiations with the Hungarian Government prematurely. Also it is still a unknown 
on what conditions will the Commission return to the negotiating table with the 
Hungarian Government delegation. 
There is a critical threshold, beyond which the regularly recurring breakdowns 
jeopardize the stability of the Hungarian state‟s financial life. This is when there are 
no more single and independent cases, but there is a tendency. 
                                                   
21 IMF (2008c) 
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6. Looking forward: Western European markets’ fears about the 
propagation of the risk  
The Western European governments have made declarations on the stability of the 
Western European banks. All the Western European banks present in Hungary have 
publicly reaffirmed their strategic commitments. The quality of assets will 
deteriorate to an extent, but the banks are too stable and too capital-strong at present 
not to be able to cope in such an event22. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was forced to 
backtrack from election pledges to put pro-growth measures ahead of budget 
discipline after the forint plunged on June 2010 on investor concern about Hungary's 
fiscal health23. The country agreed to reduce its deficit to 3.8 percent of economic 
output this year to qualify for an International Monetary Fund-led bailout. 
The IMF and EU walked away from talks with Hungary on July 2010, saying 
the government wasn‟t doing enough to control its budget deficit. Their departure 
froze emergency funding for Hungary, not necessary to be used at the moment, but 
could be a problem later if funding costs spike24. After this the prime minister came 
up with a new tactic - to separate the discussions led by the IMF from those with the 
EU. Hungary is in line to adopt the Euro and at this point is closer to meeting some 
of the currency union's debt and deficit targets than more heavily indebted member 
states like Greece and Spain. Its primary goal is to reach less than 3% budget deficit, 
which is a compulsory precondition to adopt the Euro.  
Hungary, after getting the IMF support had not been able to go to the financial 
markets for a long time to take debt, that‟s why the IMF loans came in handy. Is 
there any justification for secret meetings on deficit reduction? Secrecy breeds 
suspicion. Suspicion leads to incertitude. Incertitude affects financial markets. 
Kopits György, chair the Budget Council said: „Markets are jitterish, they don't 
know where the next land mine is going to explode. They don't know what's 
happening, and there is very low tolerance for even a new government to take the 
reins on and to really outline a full fiscal strategy.”25 
With a stabilizing economy and a strong political mandate, the new Hungarian 
government has a historic opportunity to create the conditions for sustainable growth 
and sound public finances. Their economic program includes several encouraging 
elements. But, amid large underlying vulnerabilities, it relies to a substantial extent 
on temporary and distortive measures that may jeopardize medium-term fiscal 
sustainability, increase uncertainty, and ultimately harm growth. 
The global recovery and the recent increase of global risk appetite may well 
prove temporary. Amid Hungary‟s high external and public debt, a change in 
                                                   
22 How big is Hungary‟s problem? – Interview with György Surányi www.portfolio.hu November 14, 
2008 
23 Bloomberg 2010 
24 Street Journal 2010 
25 Reuters 2010 
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investor sentiment would compound financing risks as large sovereign redemptions 
fall due in 2011–14. Also domestic demand will suffer if the Swiss Franc, whose 
value directly impacts households‟ debt servicing costs, strengthens further. Finally, 
there is a risk that the authorities will not take the necessary measures to restore 
fiscal sustainability. The associated policy uncertainty could lead to a more cautious 
behaviour by foreign investors (IMF 2010). 
7. Conclusion  
In my analysis I tried to look a bit deeper and focus at the situation that is actually 
facing the country. The Hungarian update reports the introduction of the fiscal 
responsibility law, which sets a new fiscal rule for the central government, 
establishes a new independent fiscal institution and contains some other regulations 
improving the domestic fiscal framework. Some of these new regulations were 
implemented in 2009 while others, such as the new fiscal rule, entered into force in 
January 2010. This fiscal responsibility law is expected to promote transparency and 
a medium-term fiscal planning.  
Following another provision of the new fiscal responsibility law, the 
government shall provide to the Parliament detailed information about budgetary 
measures to fulfil its medium-term fiscal plans for at least three years. In February 
2010, the government should release this information for the period 2011–2013 
(Ayuso-i-Casals 2010, p.41.). 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Hungarian economy is once again, on its 
own, decoupling from the general trend in the region. In contrast to the neighbouring 
countries (this time also including Austria, Germany and Italy), in the third and 
fourth quarter we were the only country that once again reported a negative quarterly 
growth figure. It comes as little comfort that the others aren‟t displaying robust 
growth either, although at least they are perhaps over the worst. By stepping up to 
the plate and performing the budgetary correction, the government has undoubtedly 
pulled the country back from the edge. Hungary‟s economic policy, however, 
continues to be founded on an incorrectly-structured fiscal and monetary-policy mix. 
Sometimes the inevitable strictness of the fiscal policy is manifest where it shouldn‟t 
be (an example of this is the scrapping of „social policy‟ loan subsidies in the 
housing market), or at other times it is relaxed precisely where the opposite would 
be justified (an example of this being the abolition of the fixed-amount healthcare 
contribution).  Monetary policy, as regards its principles – the exchange-rate policy, 
after a few aberrations, now stands as a refreshing exception to this – displays 
consistent continuity with past years: the monetary authority is not even examining 
the possibility of how, in an especially grave situation, to mitigate the crisis in the 
real economy through the renewal of the monetary-policy devices at its disposal.  
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The fiscal consolidation, although successful in quantitative terms, did not 
lead to economic growth, higher employment or the conditions for a better standard 
of living, and hardly improved the low growth potential of the Hungarian economy. 
With a degree of bluntness, one could say that the emergency operation was a 
success, but it remains uncertain whether the patient will live to see tomorrow or the 
day after. A rethinking of budgetary and monetary policy, and the comprehensive 
restructuring of the economic-policy mix, are essential in the interests of halting a 
rift of historic proportions, and the social disintegration of the country (Surányi 
2010, p. 23). 
In the context of an absence of fiscal space and financing difficulties, the 
policy response consisted of continued fiscal consolidation. The Hungarian 
governments could not afford the cost of the fiscal stimulus, hoping for higher 
revenues once recovery is at full speed to service the new debt and ensure 
sustainability. The Hungarian governments cut down the government activities, 
developed a more incentive tax-and subsidy-system, implemented the structural and 
process changes needed for the growth. 
The Hungarian economic policy is again credible, and there is certainly a 
visible shift in opinion, a strengthening confidence towards Hungary in the financial 
markets. The trend is positive; the decline of the Hungarian economy was not too 
dramatic, and the macro-economic data are better than expected.  
However, this confidence is not fully served yet. Presently, the Hungarian 
government has to submit the budget to the parliament. The forecasted budget 
deficit in 2011 is 2.9%, which will be one of the lowest in Europe. The average 
European budget deficit next year will be much higher than that. There is a risk that 
Hungary may be unable to raise sufficient funds on financial markets in 2011 if 
global conditions deteriorate and the government fails to extend its International 
Monetary Fund program. If external conditions deteriorate and Hungary‟s weaker 
fiscal position triggers further downgrades, external funding may dry out in the 
absence of a safety net. 
The most recent IMF study concludes: “Distortive policies such as Hungary‟s 
outsized financial sector levy are harmful to the economy. The levy is large at 0.7 
percent of GDP (more than three times the largest such tax elsewhere), serves 
exclusively fiscal purposes, and for less profitable banks amounts to a de-facto 
expropriation of capital. Its design places a disproportionate payment burden on 
foreign banks. At this juncture, the payment obligation across institutions has been 
fixed for 2010 and 2011 but remains undetermined for 2012 and beyond. The risk is 
that uncertainty about the future design of the tax leads banks to reduce their balance 
sheet size over time, with negative repercussions for credit supply and economic 
growth. To minimize the prospect for adverse reactions from banks, we suggest that 
the government send a clear and credible signal that the levy will be substantially 
reduced and/or aligned with emerging EU standards after 2011. The government‟s 
strong political mandate presents an historic opportunity to address fundamental 
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constraints to Hungary‟s growth and to bring fiscal policy sustainably back on 
track.” In my opinion Hungary is not stigmatized by the latest IMF loan. It would be 
good if the analysts would probe a bit deeper and look at the state that the Hungarian 
economy is actually in. The agreement concluded with the IMF and the fact that 
Hungary is a member of the European Union provides some degree of help and 
protection against the breakdown. 
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